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Abstract 
[From Editor’s Introduction] In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and 
Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence 
can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? 
According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this 
question by determining how much violence one can impose on an 
individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political 
participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can 
permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. 
Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the 
reductive individualist project. Bazargan-Forward argues, however, that 
political subjugation involves an institutionally embodied form of 
disrespect that has been altogether missed. A proper appreciation of this 
sort of disrespect, he contends, morally permits much greater defensive 
violence against those attempting to politically subjugate us or others. 
 
1. The Problem of Bloodless Invasions 
A so-called ‘bloodless invasion’ is a hypothetical form of military aggression 
in which the aggressing party imposes the following sort of conditional 
threat: it will resort to maiming and killing only if its victims resist the 
purely political aims of the aggressing party. The political control the 
aggressors seek is unauthorized and unjust – achieving it would violate the 
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political rights of their victims. So the victims are, in effect, given this choice: 
accede to the violation of their political rights or go to war.  
Crucial to the concept of a bloodless invasion is that the victims’ vital 
interests – viz., their lives and their bodily integrity – are conditionally 
threatened as a means to undermining their non-vital interests – viz., their 
political rights. If the victims of the aggressing party choose to resist the 
bloodless invasion, the result will be all the attendant horrors of war, 
including, we can assume, massive civilian casualties.  
Some theorists have cast doubt on the moral permissibility of resisting 
bloodless invasions on the grounds that such resistance is likely to violate the 
constraint of proportionality which states that the harms inflicted cannot be 
too great relative to the wrongful harms thereby averted.1 Since resisting a 
bloodless invasion averts threats to non-vital interests by maiming and 
killing, it seems that such resistance is likely to be unjust, on the grounds 
that it violates the constraint of proportionality. This is a problematic 
outcome insofar as defensive wars against aggressors aiming at imposing 
unjust political dominion is supposed to be paradigmatic of a just war. If 
post-Walzerian reductive individualism about the morality of war is correct 
insofar as it analyzes war as a relation between individuals rather than 
between states, then it seems we are forced to concede that defense against 
bloodless invaders is likely unjust. This means we can only fight defensive 
wars against aggressors who maim and kill (or violate equally stringent vital 
interests) for its own sake rather than as a means to or a side-effect of 
establishing political control over territory. The only just defensive wars, 
then, would be those against genocidal aggression or mass enslavement. Such 
wars are comparatively rare. The upshot, then, is that if defensive war 
against otherwise bloodless invasions are unjust,  we are forced into adopting 
a version of contingent pacifism.2  
                                                          
1 See (Rodin, Justifying Harm, 2012, pp. 74-110) for a discussion of some of the 
factors relevant to proportionality.  
2 For a discussion of different versions of contingent pacifism, see (Bazargan, 2015). 
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Some theorists regard this conclusion as evidence against the plausibility of 
reductive individualism;3 others regard a version of contingent pacifism as a 
welcomed consequence;4 still others argue that reductive individualism has 
the resources to avoid the conclusion that resisting bloodless invasions is 
unjust.5 I will call the problem of how to respond to the possibility of 
bloodless invasions, “the dilemma of bloodless invasions.” This states that we 
either have to deny that defensive wars against bloodless invasions are 
morally permissible or we must deny reductive individualism. The first 
option seems to many excessively pacifistic, while the second option is 
unpalatable to those sympathetic to reductive individualism.  
There are at least two versions of the dilemma’s first horn. Both conclude 
that defensive wars against otherwise bloodless invasions violate the 
proportionality constraint. The first version argues that such wars violate the 
narrow proportionality constraint, which states that harms imposed on 
parties morally liable to be harmed cannot be too great relative to the 
wrongful harms thereby averted. So, for example, it is presumably wrongful 
to defensively kill someone attempting to painfully pinch you unjustly even if 
that is the only way to avoid the pinch. This constraint on defensive violence 
falls under the aegis of the narrow proportionality constraint because the 
unjust pincher is morally liable to some degree of defensive harm necessary to 
stop her. She is not, however, liable to be killed. Defense against bloodless 
invasions is sometimes likewise construed as a violation of narrow 
proportionality insofar as it is argued that an individual who is only 
conditionally threatening your vital interests in order to exact concessions 
undermining your non-vital interests is morally liable only to the amount of 
defensive violence necessary to avert the threat to your non-vital interests. 
That is, the degree of harm that the violation of you non-vital interests 
consists in sets the baseline by which the proportionality of your defensive 
harm is measured. So the maximum amount of defensive harm you can 
                                                          
3 See for example (Lazar, 2014). 
4 See especially (Norman, 1995, pp. 133, 135) and (Rodin, 2002, pp. 43-48). In (Rodin, 
2014, p. 89) he argues that “a self-help regime centered on presumptive rights of self-
defense” against political aggression is morally unjustified.  
5 See for example (Fabre, 2014) and (McMahan, 2014). 
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permissibly inflict to stop a mugger who threatens to kill you if you do not 
hand over the money in your wallet is determined by the moral value of that 
money, rather than the moral value of your life.6 Likewise for bloodless 
invasions: the maximum amount of defensive harm the victims can 
permissibly inflict on the invaders is determined by the moral value of the 
non-vital interests they unconditionally threaten – the victims’ political 
rights – rather than the vital interests that they conditionally threaten – the 
victims’ lives. Accordingly, the aggressors might not be morally liable to 
lethal defensive violence.  
This argument operates by ‘scaling up’ from a case in which a single 
individual is wrongly prevented from exercising her political rights by a 
wrongful aggressor. Suppose a villain threatens to kill you if you vote in a 
particular political election. The villain points a pistol at you – the only way 
to preserve your own life is to shoot the villain first (which you are able to 
do), or to accede to her demands. It is probably a violation of the narrow 
proportionality constraint to defensively kill the villain even if doing so is 
necessary in order to vote.  
If it is a violation of proportionality to kill one unjust aggressor preventing 
you from exercising your political rights by conditionally threatening your 
life, it follows that it is a violation of proportionality to kill many unjust 
aggressors who are similarly preventing their victims from exercising their 
political rights by conditionally threatening their lives; this describes a 
bloodless invasion (or so it is argued).  
There are problems, though, with this version of the argument. The most 
pressing one, in my view, is this: each invader is complicitously liable for 
what their comrades do because each combatant has the formal function of 
assisting one another in furtherance of the war’s aims.7 As a result, each 
invader will be morally responsible for violations of the political rights of 
millions. These individual violations might aggregate in a way making each 
invader morally liable to be killed if necessary to stop the bloodless invasion.  
                                                          
6 (Norman, 1995, p. 130). For a real-life example of this sort, see (McMahan, 2009, p. 
20). 
7 I argue for this view in (Bazargan, Complicitous Liablity in War, 2012). 
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A more compelling version of the dilemma of bloodless invasions adverts to 
the wide proportionality constraint which states that harms imposed on 
parties who are not morally liable to be harmed cannot be too great relative 
to the wrongful harms thereby averted. Wars typically kill many civilians the 
vast majority of whom are not morally liable to be killed. If the violation of 
non-vital, political rights determines the threshold of the wide proportionality 
constraint, then killing many civilians as a side-effect of protecting those non-
vital interests will likely violate that constraint. The duties of care owed 
toward our own citizens who would be killed by the enemy compound the 
wrongfulness of the harms resulting from resisting the bloodless invasion – or 
so it is argued.8  
To recap, the dilemma of bloodless invasions is that we must either accept 
that resisting bloodless invasions is impermissible, or reject reductive 
individualism. The first horn of the dilemma has two versions. The first 
version adverts to the narrow proportionality constraint whereas the second 
adverts to the wide proportionality constraint. Since the latter is the more 
compelling version of the dilemma’s first horn, that is the version I will 
target.  
The bloodless invasion dilemma assumes that the political rights the invaders 
violate are non-vital, in that they are not the sorts of rights that we can 
defend at the cost of innocent lives. But bloodless invasions typically violate 
not just political rights but our interests in retaining the capability of living 
recognizably meaningful lives. And these are indeed vital – or so I will argue. 
The focus on political rights has had a distorting effect on discussions of the 
bloodless invasions dilemma. Appreciating the interests we have in regarding 
our own practical identities as worthwhile will reveal that many bloodless 
invasions can indeed be resisted by way of war. This will not completely 
dissolve the bloodless invasion dilemma since there remains the conceptual 
possibility of a bloodless invasion violating only political rights without 
undermining our interests in retaining the capability of living meaningful 
lives. But my goal here is not to dissolve the dilemma, but to complicate it 
by showing that there are some rights aside from those pertaining to life and 
limb that we can kill to protect – namely the right to self-respect. 
                                                          
8 See (Rodin, 2014, p. 84). 
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2. Dignity and Respect  
To understand what self-respect is and the role it plays in the dilemma of 
bloodless invasions, it is necessary to analyze respect simpliciter. And to do 
that, we need to look at the concept ‘dignity’ since it is the grounds of our 
entitlement to be treated with respect. ‘Dignity’ is used in various ways by 
ethicists. One the most important disambiguations is between dignity as the 
grounds of rights, and dignity as the content of those rights. That is, the 
concept might be used to refer to the source of the claim that we have that 
others treat us in certain ways; or it might be used to characterize that very 
treatment.9 So when we say that particular conduct – such as a violation of 
my autonomy – violates my dignity, we might be saying, for example, that it 
is in virtue of my inherent dignity as a person that I have a right not to have 
my autonomy violated. Or we might be saying that it is because of my status 
as a person that I have a right to be treated with dignity, which includes a 
right not to have my autonomy violated. I will use ‘dignity’ in the former 
sense to refer to the moral status persons have in virtue of which we have 
rights.10   
This analysis of dignity finds its origins most famously in Immanuel Kant. 
He used ‘wërde’ – commonly translated as ‘dignity’ – to refer to a type of 
intrinsic worth inhering in rational agents. The worth is intrinsic in that it 
does not confer value by promoting an end, but rather has value in itself. It 
is our nature as rational agents which grounds our dignity. Rational agents 
possess dignity in virtue of their autonomy, which is the power to legislate 
moral laws and to act in accordance with them without influence from 
heteronomous inclinations. We connote this special status by calling the 
beings possessing it ‘persons’. The required response to dignity is achtung – 
                                                          
9 (Waldron, 2012, p. 17) 
 For example, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights seems to 
conceptualize dignity in this way when it states in the preamble that rights “derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person”.10 
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respect – which requires we treat persons as ends in themselves. Because 
dignity is absolute and non-comparable and because dignity is grounded in 
features that all persons possess, the intrinsic worth of all person is equal, on 
Kant’s account. Hence each person, in virtue of her autonomous nature, is 
owed respect regardless of her personal achievements, social rank, or moral 
conduct. 
More modern writers also ground rights in dignity-as-status. James Griffin, 
inspired by the fifteenth-century writer Pico della Mirandola, develops the 
idea that dignity is the human capacity “to… be that which he wills”. Beings 
possessing this capacity are what Griffin calls ‘normative agents’.11  
Possessing this capacity is “a highly-prized status” – one which grounds “[t]he 
sort of dignity relevant to human rights.”12 It grounds our rights in that 
protecting them – for example, by respecting our autonomy – upholds our 
normative agency. 
Joel Feinberg and Jan Narveson also propound the view that dignity-as-
status grounds rights. On their account, to have a legal right is to possess the 
dignity of a “recognized claimant” – someone entitled to demand that her 
case be considered. They suggest that human dignity consists in the status of 
possessing “the recognizable capacity to assert claims”.13  Similarly, Stephen 
Darwall states that dignity consists in “the second-personal standing” each 
individual has which authorizes every individual “to make claims and 
demands on one another as free and rational agents” – claims and demands 
that others must respect.14  
On all these views, dignity-as-status grounds a right to what has come to be 
called ‘(moral) recognition-respect’. Recognition-respect is an attitude 
consisting in giving appropriate consideration to some (morally relevant) 
features of the object of respect in the course of deliberation. To say that a 
person qua person is entitled to recognition-respect is to say that she is 
entitled to have others, in their deliberations, take seriously and weigh 
                                                          
11 (Griffin, 2009, p. 31) 
12 (Griffin, 2009, p. 152) 
13 (Feinberg, 1970, p. 252) 
14 (Darwall, 2004, pp. 43-44) 
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appropriately the fact that she is a person. What qualifies as ‘taking 
seriously’ and ‘weighing appropriately’ will depend on the specific account of 
what recognition-respect requires.15 But regardless of how the details work 
out, recognition-respect requires that the relevant features of its object factor 
into our deliberations about how to treat that object. Crucially, the 
restrictions and requirements on our actions deriving from recognition-respect 
are not incidental but instead arise from the relevant features demanding 
recognition-respect – such as rational agency, or the ability to feel pain.  
Whereas the appraisal of individual excellences will and ought to vary from 
person to person according to her character and abilities, the recognition-
respect to which individuals are entitled will be the same for everyone, 
insofar as such respect is grounded in the dignity-as-status which each 
individual shares in common. Whether the dignity grounding recognition-
respect derives from our status as autonomous agents (as Kant thinks), or 
our status as normative agents (as Griffin thinks), or our second-personal 
standing as free and rational agents (as Darwall thinks), or our recognizable 
capacity to assert claims (as Feinberg and Narveson think),  the fact remains 
that everyone who has the relevant status has it to the same degree and in 
the same way, thereby demanding the same basic treatment: the recognition-
respect of our fundamental dignity as persons. 
 
3. Expressivist Accounts 
Some have tried to ground the claim that we are permitted to resist 
otherwise bloodless invasions by appealing to the claim that oppressive 
regimes systemically violate the recognition-respect we are owed.16 When we 
                                                          
15 (Darwall, 1977, p. 38) 
16 See (Iser, 2016). Whereas he argues that averting violations of recognition-respect is 
itself sufficient grounds for resisting otherwise bloodless invasions, I will argue that 
the effects such violations have on the self-respect of its victims is what provides such 
grounds. The practical difference is this: on Iser’s account virtually all bloodless 
invasions can be permissibly resisted as a last resort since such regimes by imposing 
unauthorized laws eo ipso violate the recognition-respect the people are owed. On my 
account, however, we can only resist bloodless invasions that will otherwise impose 
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harm someone in a way that violates the recognition-respect owed in virtue 
of her dignity, we are acting wrongfully. Insofar as oppressive regimes not 
only violate political rights but systemically deny the recognition-respect the 
population is owed, the wrong that they commit is compounded in a way 
that permits violent resistance – or so it might be argued. The challenge is to 
specify the way that denying recognition-respect wrongs its victims.  
When we commit a wrong, we do not always thereby deny the victim 
fundamental recognition-respect since not all rights-violations suggest that 
the wrongdoer thinks that the victim is less than a full-fledged person. For 
example, an assassin might murder a target despite knowing that what she is 
doing is morally verboten; she knows that the victim has a legitimate moral 
claim against her, grounded in her status as a person, that the assassin 
refrain from ending her life. But she does so anyway because she is not 
properly or sufficiently motivated by what she knows to be true.  
Perhaps, though, the assassin’s conduct belies the claim that she believes 
that the victim is a full-fledged person with all the attendant rights. We can 
nonetheless usefully distinguish the assassin from a wrongdoer for whom the 
victim’s status plays an explicit motivational role in explaining why the 
wrongdoer committed the harm. A racist who kills partly because she 
believes that the victim is not a full-fledged person is an example. This partly 
explains why we might think that rights-violation motivated by abject forms 
of racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, are especially wrongful. The 
wrong of a racist assault violates the right that the victim has against being 
physically harmed; but this wrong is aggravated by the fact it was motivated 
by a belief that the victim bears a fundamental moral status less exalted 
than that of the wrongdoer’s preferred race. So the wrongdoer here commits 
a double wrong (or perhaps a morally aggravated wrong). She fails to abide 
by the rights in question, but she also violates the recognition-respect of the 
victim at least partly out of the belief that the victim lacks the fundamental 
dignity-as-status grounding a moral protection against such rights-violations.  
So wrongs motivated in part by the belief that the victim is not a full-fledged 
person seem morally worse. One might attempt to explain this by appealing 
                                                                                                                                         
norms that undercut our ability to live recognizably meaningful life (see sections 5 
and 6).  
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to expressivist accounts of wrongdoing. According to such theories, what 
individuals express in their actions matters morally in that such expressions 
play a substantial role in explaining or grounding the wrongfulness of certain 
kinds of immoral conduct.17 When a harm we commit is motivated or 
otherwise explained by a wrongful attitude – such as the belief that the 
victim lacks fundamental moral worth – the manifestation of that attitude in 
our action makes the act especially wrongful.18 This is an expressive wrong. 
Expressivism is not a theory of normative ethics, on par with 
consequentialism or Kantianism. It does not specify substantive, independent, 
content-laden grounds for moral content. Rather, it makes a claim about how 
attitudes are manifest in action, and the way doing so is relevant to the 
moral assessment of action: expressive wrongs are wrongs over and above the 
object-level violation of a right not to be attacked, deceived, defrauded, and 
so on.  
Importantly, expression is not the same as communication. An actor 
expresses an attitude simply by adverting to particular reasons for action. 
“To ascribe attitudes to an agent coherently,” write Elizabeth Anderson and 
Richard Pildes, “we need only be able to sensibly interpret the agent’s actions 
as resulting from reasons -- that is, as taking particular goals or purposes as 
reasons for particular actions.”19 Acting on the reasons in questions manifests 
the expressive content of the action. Communication, on the other hand, 
requires (on a Gricean account) that the communicator intends to induce 
certain attitudes in an audience where the audience reasons their way to 
those attitudes via their recognition of the communicator’s intention to 
induce those very attitudes. Accordingly, communicative acts represent a 
small subset of expressive acts.  
Expression should not be confused with profession either. Linguistic 
utterances fail to carry the same social meaning as expressive actions, in that 
“there are some things we can express only with deeds because words alone 
cannot adequately convey our attitudes.”20 On this view, the wrongfulness of 
                                                          
17 (p. 1570) 
18 (Anderson & Pildes, 2000, p. 1509)  
19 (p. 1520) 
20 (p. 1568) 
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an expressive wrong is not limited to what it reveals about the wrongdoer’s 
attitudes. The reification and manifestation of that attitude via action 
constitutes part of the wrong. The medium, as it were, is an ineluctable part 
of what is expressed. When a wrongdoer is motivated to commit a rights-
violations out of the belief that the victim is not entitled to the recognition-
respect to which full-fledged persons are entitled, and when this belief is 
expressed in their actions thereby revealing to the victim that the wrongdoer 
has this belief, the victim is thereby harmed over and above whatever harm 
the rights-violation itself consists in.   
This version of expressivism has the resources, I believe, to explain why we 
are permitted to resist certain bloodless invasions. In what follows I argue 
that systematically denying recognition-respect by imposing oppressive social 
and legal norms can inflict expressive harms which undercut the victim’s self-
respect to an extent that makes it difficult to live a recognizably meaningful 
life. It is, ultimately, to prevent this sort of outcome that we can resist 
bloodless invasions. 
 
4. On Self-Respect 
Systemically denying the recognition-respect a victim is owed in virtue of her 
dignity-as-status can result in a harm over and above each individual harm 
in which that denial consists. Specifically, systemically denying recognition-
respect to a victim can do violence to the victim’s sense of self-respect.   
John Rawls famously wrote that “perhaps the most important primary good 
is that of self-respect.”21  Laurence Thomas identifies securing the self-respect 
of blacks as the goal of the civil rights movement.22 Modern philosophical 
accounts vary greatly, though, in what self-respect fundamentally is. Some 
                                                          
21 (Rawls, 1971, p. 386) I will return to Rawls’s account of self-respect. For criticism 
of the view that self-respect is the most important primary social good, see (Massey, 
1983, p. 259). Other have argued that Rawls equivocates between two different 
notions of self-respect. See (Doppelt, 2009), (Eyal, 2009), and (Moriarty, 2009). But 
see also (Stark, 2011). 
22 (Thomas, 1983) 
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conceptualize self-respect as fundamentally a belief about one’s self.23 Some 
take it to be fundamentally a disposition.24 Others regard it as fundamentally 
interpersonal in that it includes expectations about how others will respond 
to one’s own actions.25 Some argue in favor of an ‘objective’ account in which 
you have self-respect only if such self-respect is warranted. Others argue in 
favor of a subjective account.26 But as Robin Miller points out, all of these 
accounts share in common the view that self-respect involves “a sense of self-
worth.”27  
The sense of worth implicit in self-respect can be divided into the kind of 
worth that individuals earn – merit, which can be gained or lost – and the 
kind of worth inhering in our fundamental status as persons – dignity, which 
is inalienable, unearned, and invariable. I will focus on the latter kind of self-
respect. In the same way that respecting others means appreciating their 
fundamental status as persons, bearing self-respect means appreciating one’s 
own fundamental moral status as a person. To have self-respect, then, “is to 
understand oneself to be a person with the same intrinsic value and standing 
in the moral community as every other person and unconditionally owed the 
equal recognition respect of all persons.”28  
Diminished self-respect threatens to undermine what Robin Dillon calls 
“basal” self-respect, which establishes at the most basic level our sense of 
whether our practical identity is of any worth. “The heart of basal self-
respect,” she says, “is our most profound valuing of ourselves”.29 Diminished 
                                                          
23 See (Rawls, 1971, pp. 386-391), (Thomas, 1983), and (Moody-Adams, 1993). 
24 See (Telfer, 1968), (Darwall, 1977), and (Sachs, 1981). 
25 See (Taylor, 1985). 
26 See (Massey, 1983). 
27 (Dillon, 1995, p. 20) 
28 (Dillon, 1992, p. 55)  
29 (Dillon, 1997, p. 242) As Daniel Statman notes (in addition to Dillon herself), the 
psychological literature bears out Dillon’s notion of basal self-respect. He cites 
empirical work distinguishing between ‘contingent’ and ‘true’ self-esteem, where the 
former esteem resulting from satisfying one’s one special criteria of excellence, whereas 
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self-respect threatens basal self-respect in the following way. A person will 
believe that her practical identity imparts a life worth living only if she 
believes that she is constitutionally capable of possessing a life worth living 
in the first place. If her recognition self-respect is damaged, then she by 
definition does not think of herself as a person with the same intrinsic value 
as everyone else. This means no matter what practical identity she has or 
adopts – no matter how she chooses to live her life – there is a ceiling on the 
value of who she is. If the absence of recognition self-respect is 
thoroughgoing, she believes that no practical identity of substantial worth is 
available to her. And this is just to say that she lacks basal self-respect. 
Self-respect, as I have discussed it so far, is chiefly a psychological concept.30 
It refers to favorable self-regarding evaluative beliefs and feelings. To possess 
this sort of self-respect, it is not necessary that the beliefs be correct or that 
the feelings be warranted. The only criteria relevant to determining whether 
an agent is worthy of the favorable self-regarding evaluative beliefs and 
feelings is the agent’s own. That is, there are no independent standards she 
must meet in order to have this sort of ‘subjective’ self-respect 
In contrast, an individual possesses objective self-respect only if the favorable 
self-regarding evaluative beliefs and feelings satisfy objective criteria. Thus 
an individual possesses objective self-respect only if she correctly recognizes 
and values her moral status as a person with equal basic rights. And a person 
possesses objective appraisal self-respect only if her achievements actually 
warrant the positive evaluation she gives them. On this view, self-respect is 
not just a matter of valuing yourself, but doing so properly. This means that 
sometimes individuals might possess subjective self-respect but not objective 
self-respective, or vice versa. This happens in cases where a person’s own 
basis for self-respect come apart from what the appropriate bases are. We 
might accordingly say that such an individual possesses too much or too little 
subjective self-respect, in that her behavior and attitudes fail to match 
independent standards of evaluative worth.  
                                                                                                                                         
the latter is grounded in “a solid sense of self” largely independent of meeting 
meritorious criteria. See (Statman, 2000, p. 538). 
30 (Massey, 1983) 
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Perhaps the most famous subjective account of self-respect in modern 
philosophy belongs to John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, he defines self-
respect as including “…a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction 
that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.”31 In 
Political Liberalism, he characterizes self-respect as “rooted in our self-
confidence as a fully cooperating member of society capable of pursuing a 
worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life.”32 In what follows I 
describe the sorts of psychological harms that wrongfully undermining this 
sort of subjective self-respect can cause. After, I explain how undermining 
objective self-respect can be harmful even if it does not cause those 
psychological harms. 
 
5. Undermining Subjective Self-Respect 
Diminished subjective self-respect, to the extent that it undermines basal 
self-respect, infects every aspect of the victim’s life. When our basal self-
respect is damaged, we are unable to justify who are and what we do to 
ourselves or to others. The result, as Dillon puts is, is that  
“the abiding flavor of our life is shame, self-contempt, or self-
hatred, or anxiety, despair, or apathy about our worth… we 
experience a profound and pervasive sense of ourselves as 
inconsequential, inadequate, worthless, not as comparatively 
valuable, or not as worthy as they of the good things in life… our 
lives seem meaningless, our activities of little value, our 
capabilities minimal, our character base… when living is like this 
living well is impossible.”33   
For this reason among others having a secure sense of self-respect is morally 
important.  A powerful political regime is capable of undermining the self-
respect of entire populations, thereby plunging their lives in to the kind of 
purgatory Dillon describes. This is because self-respect is in part socially 
                                                          
31 (Rawls, 1971, p. 440) 
32 (Rawls, 2005, p. 318) 
33 (Dillon, 1995, p. 34) 
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constructed; it is determined in part by and reflects the norms of social life.34 
Every society, by way of its cultural, political, and economic practices and 
institutions, develops norms establishing criteria of self-worth; societies 
consequently provide the framework in which individuals may seek self-
respect. In a society discriminating on the basis of race, class, gender, (and so 
on) the norms establishing the criteria for self-respect devalue those people. 
The result is that members of the disfavored groups have difficulty 
establishing and maintaining self-respect. To the extent that a political 
regime is able to influence or determine the cultural, political, and economic 
practices and institutions of a country, it is capable of profoundly influencing 
the self-respect of large swaths of the population.  
When an oppressive regime undermines the self-respect of a population by 
instituting oppressive social and legal norms, the downstream effects can be 
devastating. Dillon notes for example that  
…it is impossible to address the crisis concerning the African 
American community, especially in America’s inner cities – 
increasing racial discord and violence […] the tragically high 
death rate of young Black men; the failure of educational 
systems to meet even minimal needs of African American 
children; chronic underemployment and welfare dependency; the 
wasted lives, thwarted talents and hopeless rage that 
characterizes the Black underclass – without some attention to 
the self-hatred and crippled self-worth that fuels and is fueled by 
these conditions.35  
Social scientists have explained how diminished self-respect can take root and 
spread so easily in a society with oppressive social and legal norms. For 
example, Robert Merton has described a phenomenon which he calls the “self-
fulfilling prophecy” in which an individual is prompted to engage in behavior 
harmful to herself or others precisely because she knows that she is expected 
                                                          
34 For further discussion of the sociopolitical determinants of self-respect see (Dillon, 
1997). 
35 (Dillon, 1995, p. 36) 
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by others to behave as such.36 For example, suppose an instructor does not 
expect superior or even adequate academic performance from her Black 
pupils. These pupils, knowing that their efforts won't be taken seriously, 
refrain from putting forth that effort. The result is that the student does 
poorly, which seems to confirm the instructor’s prediction – not only for the 
instructor, but crucially, for the students as well.37 Gordon Allport describes 
a related social phenomenon, which he dubs the “reciprocal conduct of human 
beings in interaction.”38 He notes that negative expectations about behavior, 
and the subsequent behavior exhibited, will tend to converge. For example, a 
policy of racial exclusion and animosity toward a minority group might be 
motivated by the racist belief that members of that minority are violent. 
This policy will tend to elicit anger and bitterness in the victims, sometimes 
expressed through violence, which seemingly confirms the soundness of the 
racist policy, thereby reinforcing it.  
Because social institutions have these sorts of profound effects on subjective 
self-respect, and because undermining self-respect undermines our ability to 
live recognizably worthwhile lives, Thomas (in accordance with Rawls) 
argues that we should evaluate social institutions primarily according to 
whether it is conducive to the self-respect of the individuals in that society.39 
And one factor determining whether a social institution is conductive to self-
respect is whether that institution recognizes equal rights by enshrining them 
in law. As Diana Meyers points out, such legal rights “promote self-respect by 
creating a social environment conducive to the autonomous creation and 
pursuit of life plans.”40 Denying such legal recognition is wrong not just 
because the victims have the right to such legal recognition, but because 
doing so has debilitating psychological effects, of the sort described.41 We are 
                                                          
36 (Merton, 1948) 
37 (Himma, 2001) 
38 (Alport, 1979)  
39 (Thomas, 1983) 
40 (Meyers, 1986, p. 87) 
41 It is still each individual’s responsibility to ensure that the bases of her subjective 
self-respect are not overly demanding of others. Suppose my sense of self-respect 
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in a position, then, to characterize the sort of expressive harms that bigoted 
oppressive regimes cause: the oppressive norms that the regimes impose 
diminish self-respect in that the victims come to believe that they are not 
worthy of the ends closed off to them.  
Acceding to a bloodless invasion aiming to demote all or a portion of the 
population to second-class status – socially, legally, and culturally – does not 
thereby undermine that group’s vital interests. But it does risk preventing 
them from living meaningful lives by imposing norms undermining their 
subjective self-respect, without which they are incapable of seeing themselves 
as possessing the sort of value that makes our ends worth pursuing. I submit, 
then, that that the moral permission to prevent the sorts of psychological 
harms precluding the possibility of living a recognizably meaningful life is as 
stringent or nearly as stringent as the moral permissions to protect life and 
limb. So if killing innocents as a side-effect of preventing unjust aggressors 
from killing us can satisfy the wide proportionality constraint, then killing 
innocents as a side-effect of preventing unjust aggressors from depriving us of 
the ability to live meaningful lives can satisfy the wide proportionality 
constraint as well.  
This seems to show that we can permissibly respond to an otherwise 
bloodless invasion with warfare even if absent that response our vital 
interests would not have been threatened – provided that the aggressors, left 
unopposed, would have reduced the population or part of the population to 
second-class status by depriving them of their basic civil rights (though 
presumably the wronged population must be sizeable enough for violent 
resistance to satisfy the proportionality constraint – this goes for resisting 
violent aggression as well). Bloodless invaders often target a particular 
ethnicity, race, gender, nationality, religion, or culture for second-class 
treatment. But the aggressor might deny or deprive basic civil rights to a 
population that meets other criteria – from geographic location to political 
affiliation. These groups would also be entitled to violent resistance, all 
                                                                                                                                         
demands that others grovel before me. I cannot permissibly force them to abide by 
this requirement even if their failure to do so will plunge me into depression. This is 
because objective self-respect places an upper limit on the permissible bases of 
subjective self-respect. 
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things being equal, for the same reasons. In addition, there needn’t be a 
privileged group bearing full civil rights for those deprived of their basic civil 
rights to violently resist permissibly. 
A proponent of the view that we ought to accede to bloodless invasions 
might argue that this conclusion is too quick. The debilitating downstream 
psychological effects of instituting bigoted social and legal norms – that is, 
the effects of the regime’s expressive harms – do not occur immediately. It 
might take years or decades for the new, oppressive norms to undermine the 
self-respect of the victimized population to the point that they are no longer 
capable of leading recognizably meaningful lives. In the meantime, there 
remains the possibility of non-violent resistance as a means to either 
overthrowing the ruling regime, or pressuring it to recognize the civil rights 
of the aggrieved population. Of course, passive resistance is not always 
successful – but neither is the relevant alternative, which is war with its 
attendant devastation. The upshot is that a contingent pacifist who argues 
that we should accede to bloodless invasions can acknowledge the debilitating 
downstream psychological effects of imposing oppressive social and legal 
norms, while consistently maintaining that we should nonetheless accede, 
provided that passive resistance remains a live possibility.  
The problem with this view, though, is that it ignores the fact that over time 
the victims internalize the oppressive norms of the regime in ways that 
prevents them from recognizing the reasons they have to resist. To 
understand this problem, it is necessary to move from a discussion of 
subjective self-respect to objective self-respect. 
 
6. Undermining Objective Self-Respect 
As we have seen, systemic failures to give an individual the recognition-
respect to which she is entitled as a person can undermine the victim’s self-
respect in profound ways. But many of the negative downstream 
psychological effects of forcing a population to see themselves as inferior are 
absent in cases where the victims internalize the oppressive norms by not 
only coming to see herself as less worthy than others, but also by failing to 
see this as morally problematic. Recall that subjective self-respect is based on 
standards of personhood endorsed by that individual. If an individual accepts 
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standards permitting her to debase or degrade herself before others, the 
result will be that she possesses self-respect where it is actually unwarranted. 
This is a case where subjective self-respect is a force for the oppressive status 
quo in the form of servility. Such individuals come to accept, and even thrive 
in their allotted, circumscribed social roles. Take for example an ‘Uncle Tom’ 
– a black man deferential to the authority of whites, which Thomas Hill 
described as such:  
He always steps aside for white men; he does not complain when 
less qualified whites take over his job; he gratefully accepts 
whatever benefits his all-white government and employers allot 
him, and he would not think of protesting its insufficiency. He 
displays the symbols of deference to whites, and of contempt 
towards blacks: he faces the former with bowed stance and a 
ready 'sir' and 'Ma'am'; he reserves his strongest obscenities for 
the latter.42  
The Uncle Tom is not a cunning manipulator who shrewdly avoids reprisals 
to himself or to his family by maintaining good terms with those in power 
while privately disdaining their authority and disavowing his expressions of 
fealty. Rather, he accepts without question that as a black individual, “what 
he values, aspires for, and can demand is of less importance than what whites 
value, aspire for, and can demand.”43 
Here is another potential example of how internalizing oppressive norms can 
result in servility. In 1944, just after the Great Bengal Famine, 45.6% of 
widowers surveyed ranked their health as either “ill” or “indifferent.” Only 
2.5% of widows ranked themselves the same way. Yet all the other evidence 
indicated that the widows were either as badly off or worse off than the 
widowers. In effect, masses of starving women claimed not to be ill. Amartya 
Sen argued that the Bengali women believed that given the scarcity of food, 
they should not consume what little there was.44 They believed this as a 
result of having internalized prevalent sexist norms that discounted the 
                                                          
42 (Hill Jr., 1982, p. 88) 
43 (Hill Jr., 1982, p. 88) 
44 (Sen, 1984), (Sen, 1995). 
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interests of women. As a result, they did not recognize that they had a 
reason to complain about their own starvation.  
We can see, then, why responding to a bloodless invasion by acceding to it, 
and then bidding its victims to passively resist for decades to come in the 
hopes of overturning the oppressive social and legal norms, is problematic. A 
passive, intergenerational conflict against an oppressive regime will abate if 
the victimized population comes to internalize the oppressive norms. By 
doing so they fail to see these norms as morally problematic; consequently, 
they will not fight against them, even passively. Indeed, the challenges that 
many civil rights movements face is not limited to resisting the overwhelming 
political, military, and juridical power of a racist regime; a more basic 
problem is unseating the recalcitrant attitude among the oppressed that the 
status quo is unproblematic. As Dillon points out, one of the themes of 
Martin Luther King’s “Letters from Birmingham Jail” is the inability of 
blacks to “see the intolerable as intolerable” as a result of generations of 
oppression.45 Given this tendency, the suggestion by contingent pacifists that 
we respond to bloodless invasion by engaging in passive, intergenerational 
resistance risks entrenching the oppressive regime by eliminating the source 
of opposition – i.e., the victims who are not yet in the grip of internalized 
oppression. In short, the prospects of effective passive resistance will likely 
dim as time passes.  
Against this, however, one might note that those who internalize oppressive 
norms are often largely content with their lives, precisely because they have 
internalized those norms. Consider again the case of the Bengali women and 
the Uncle Tom. There is a sense in which these victims fail to respect 
themselves in that they do not take seriously their own moral status and 
rights. Yet it is perfectly possible for the victims to see themselves as acting 
with self-respect. For example, Stephen Massey asks us to imagine that the 
Uncle Tom is honest, trustworthy, and deeply concerned for the happiness of 
his kith and kin. “He may not regard his values and the fulfillment of his 
desires as having an importance equal to his master's, but he thinks they 
have some importance and respects himself for meeting what he regards as 
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his obligations.”46 We can also easily imagine that the Bengali women respect 
themselves for recognizing and responding to the perceived self-abnegating 
duties. In these cases, the victims would not regard themselves as lacking 
self-respect. The result is that many of the debilitating psychological effects 
of lacking subjective self-respect are absent in these cases.  
One might reiterate that the victims in these cases lack objective self-respect; 
but the challenge is to explain why we should believe that this state of affairs 
is particularly bad. After all, by hypothesis, the victims do not see 
themselves as victimized. Nor are they (we can assume) particularly unhappy 
or unsatisfied. To the extent that we have difficulty explaining what is so 
bad about this state of affairs, we have difficulty explaining how bloodless 
invasions leading to this state of affairs can be permissibly resisted at the 
cost of innocent lives. That is, though the victims of a bloodless invasion who 
internalize the oppressive norms of the regime might thereby come to lack 
objective self-respect, this seems to be no basis for resorting to war so long as 
they do not suffer psychologically debilitating harms. The upshot is that the 
contingent pacifist can admit that over time the prospect of effective passive 
resistance will diminish in accordance with the propensity for the population 
to internalize the regime’s oppressive norms; but this is a self-correcting 
problem in that as the population comes to internalize those norms, the need 
for revolution diminishes.  
The problem with this response, though, is that it understates what is wrong 
with the sort of servility concomitant with the absence of objective self-
respect. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant argued that 
our dignity as rational beings demands not only that others respect us qua 
persons, but that we respect ourselves qua persons – i.e., as ends in ourselves. 
We accordingly are enjoined to refrain from acting in ways that debase, 
degrade, or disavow our status as rational beings. We might say, then, that 
we have a duty of objective self-respect. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant 
claimed that this duty of self-respect is the most important moral duty partly 
because it is precondition for recognizing and acting upon all other moral 
duties. Servility, then, is contrary to a perfect non-juridical duty to oneself. 
The duty is perfect in that the circumstances in which it applies are fully 
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determinate and not subject to our own volitional preferences – we can’t 
“pick and choose” when to abide by the duty. And the duty is non-juridical in 
that a person cannot be permissibly coerced to abide by the duty. 
But this account of what is wrong with servility is unconvincing because we 
tend to think that what morality obligates us to do must be characterizable 
in part as claims that others have against us, whether these claims are 
second-personal or third-personal. This means that a moral duty that I have 
to respect my own status as a rational being amounts to a claim that I have 
against myself. But it is unclear how to make sense of first-personal claims. 
Some have argued, in Kantian fashion, that the object of the claim is 
‘morality itself’, rather than other individuals. Morality accordingly enjoins 
us not to disavow our moral status.47  
A more promising approach – one more congenial to the view that 
internalized oppression is a self-inflicted harm and not necessarily a self-
inflicted wrong – focuses on how internalized oppression damages our rational 
capacities. Carol Hay explores several ways in which internalized oppression 
can damage our rational capacities so thoroughly that our ability to act 
rationally is severely, and sometimes permanently, compromised.48 For 
example, internalized oppression causes self-deception insofar as the 
oppressive social systems creates incentives for the oppressed people to 
believe certain falsehoods about themselves, contrary to the available 
evidence. This, in turn, impinges upon our autonomy; because we are acting 
under substantial falsehoods inculcated by the dominant class about who we 
are and what we are capable of, our resulting decisions while in the grip of 
internalized oppression cannot be regarded as fully autonomous. In addition, 
internalized oppression can damage our capacity for rational deliberation. 
Servile individuals have less deliberative control over which goals they pursue 
and what means by which they pursue them. This impairs their deliberative 
capacities insofar as they are left unexercised and uncultivated (which in turn 
reinforces the belief that the victims are constitutionally incapable of 
exercising deliberative independence). 
                                                          
47 The most influential modern account of this sort belongs to (Hill Jr., 1982). 
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Given this account of what makes internalized oppression harmful, we can 
better understand why it is wrongful to oppress a people, even if they come 
to adapt to that oppression by internalizing its morally pernicious norms. By 
doing so, they maintain some degree of subjective self-respect, thereby 
insulating themselves from the debilitating psychological effects of coming to 
believe that their practical identities are without worth. But internalizing 
oppressive norms also has the effect of damaging their most fundamental 
rational capacities.     
Can we go to war to protect these capacities? More to the point, is it 
permissible to kill innocents as a side-effect of protecting our autonomy and 
fundamental rational capacities? It is difficult to weigh the value of 
protecting these capacities against the disvalue of lost innocent life. But it is 
not my purpose to demonstrate definitively that violently resisting bloodless 
invasions will typically be permissible. Rather, my goal is to show that when 
doing the proportionality calculation determining whether we are morally 
required to surrender, we ought to include more than has been properly 
appreciated. In calculating the moral costs of surrendering, we obviously 
include the setback to our political interests resulting from surrendering our 
rights of political autonomy and political self-determination. But we also 
ought to include the moral costs of suffering from violations of recognition-
respect. Specifically, systematically denying recognition-respect by imposing 
oppressive social and legal norms can inflict expressive harms which undercut 
the victim’s self-respect to an extent that in severe cases makes it difficult to 
live a recognizably meaningful life. Where the victimized population will 
ultimately internalize the oppressive norms, we ought to include the moral 
costs of undermined objective self-respect. These costs will include diminished 
rational capacities and diminished autonomy. Once we grasp these 
debilitating moral harms and include them in the proportionality calculation, 
the claim that we typically must accept them rather than kill to prevent 
them becomes that much more difficult to accept. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Recall that in the dilemma of bloodless invasions, the maximum amount of 
defensive harm the victims can permissibly inflict on invaders is determined 
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by the moral value of the non-vital interests they unconditionally threaten. If 
this is limited to the victims’ political rights, then it is hard to justify a 
defensive war. But if what I have argued is correct, the harms the invaders 
will unconditionally commit is not limited to undermining our political rights 
when they do so by imposing oppressive social and legal norms. This is 
because the expressive harms caused by imposing such norms undercuts the 
subjective self-respect among members of the oppressed population who 
retain the capability of recognizing that they are victims of the new social 
order. And they undercut the objective self-respect of those who internalize 
the oppressive social norms of that regime. Inasmuch, the maximum amount 
of harms we can inflict in such a case is determined not solely by the value of 
retaining legal rights to political representation, but by the value of living a 
recognizably worthwhile life, and the value of protecting our rational agency. 
I suggest that the aim of averting the debilitating psychological effects of 
diminished subjective self-respect among members of the oppressed group can 
satisfy the wide-proportionality constraint for war; likewise, for the aim of 
averting the damage to deliberative capacities of among members of the 
oppressed group who have internalized the norms of the oppressors (thereby 
manifesting a lack of objective self-respect).  
The upshot is that we can indeed, at least in principle, go to war against an 
otherwise bloodless invader intent on imposing oppressive social and legal 
norms. This does not vindicate the view that defensive wars against all 
otherwise bloodless invasion are permissible – but I do not think that such a 
conclusion is one we should seek to defend.   
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